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wireshark: Fix CVE-2023-2855 & CVE-2023-2856
Backport fixes for: * CVE-2023-2855 - Upstream-Status: Backport from0181fafb21* CVE-2023-2856 - Upstream-Status: Backport fromdb5135826dSigned-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
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From 0181fafb2134a177328443a60b5e29c4ee1041cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Guy Harris <gharris@sonic.net>
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Date: Tue, 16 May 2023 12:05:07 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH] candump: check for a too-long frame length.
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If the frame length is longer than the maximum, report an error in the
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file.
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Fixes #19062, preventing the overflow on a buffer on the stack (assuming
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your compiler doesn't call a bounds-checknig version of memcpy() if the
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size of the target space is known).
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/0181fafb2134a177328443a60b5e29c4ee1041cb]
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CVE: CVE-2023-2855
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Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
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---
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wiretap/candump.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
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1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/wiretap/candump.c b/wiretap/candump.c
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index 0def7bc..3f7c2b2 100644
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--- a/wiretap/candump.c
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+++ b/wiretap/candump.c
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@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ static gboolean candump_seek_read(wtap *wth, gint64 seek_off,
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wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf,
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int *err, gchar **err_info);
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-static void
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-candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg)
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+static gboolean
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+candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg, int *err,
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+ gchar **err_info)
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{
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static const char *can_proto_name = "can-hostendian";
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static const char *canfd_proto_name = "canfd";
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@@ -59,6 +60,18 @@ candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg)
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{
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canfd_frame_t canfd_frame = {0};
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+ /*
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+ * There's a maximum of CANFD_MAX_DLEN bytes in a CAN-FD frame.
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+ */
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+ if (msg->data.length > CANFD_MAX_DLEN) {
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+ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
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+ if (err_info != NULL) {
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+ *err_info = g_strdup_printf("candump: File has %u-byte CAN FD packet, bigger than maximum of %u",
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+ msg->data.length, CANFD_MAX_DLEN);
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+ }
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+ return FALSE;
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+ }
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+
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canfd_frame.can_id = msg->id;
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canfd_frame.flags = msg->flags;
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canfd_frame.len = msg->data.length;
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@@ -70,6 +83,18 @@ candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg)
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{
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can_frame_t can_frame = {0};
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+ /*
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+ * There's a maximum of CAN_MAX_DLEN bytes in a CAN frame.
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+ */
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+ if (msg->data.length > CAN_MAX_DLEN) {
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+ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
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+ if (err_info != NULL) {
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+ *err_info = g_strdup_printf("candump: File has %u-byte CAN packet, bigger than maximum of %u",
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+ msg->data.length, CAN_MAX_DLEN);
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+ }
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+ return FALSE;
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+ }
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+
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can_frame.can_id = msg->id;
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can_frame.can_dlc = msg->data.length;
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memcpy(can_frame.data, msg->data.data, msg->data.length);
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@@ -84,6 +109,8 @@ candump_write_packet(wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, const msg_t *msg)
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rec->rec_header.packet_header.caplen = packet_length;
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rec->rec_header.packet_header.len = packet_length;
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+
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+ return TRUE;
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}
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static gboolean
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@@ -190,9 +217,7 @@ candump_read(wtap *wth, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_info,
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ws_debug_printf("%s: Stopped at offset %" PRIi64 "\n", G_STRFUNC, file_tell(wth->fh));
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#endif
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- candump_write_packet(rec, buf, &msg);
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-
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- return TRUE;
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+ return candump_write_packet(rec, buf, &msg, err, err_info);
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}
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static gboolean
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@@ -216,9 +241,7 @@ candump_seek_read(wtap *wth , gint64 seek_off, wtap_rec *rec,
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if (!candump_parse(wth->random_fh, &msg, NULL, err, err_info))
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return FALSE;
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- candump_write_packet(rec, buf, &msg);
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-
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- return TRUE;
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+ return candump_write_packet(rec, buf, &msg, err, err_info);
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}
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/*
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--
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2.25.1
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@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
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From db5135826de3a5fdb3618225c2ff02f4207012ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Guy Harris <gharris@sonic.net>
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Date: Thu, 18 May 2023 15:03:23 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH] vms: fix the search for the packet length field.
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The packet length field is of the form
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Total Length = DDD = ^xXXX
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where "DDD" is the length in decimal and "XXX" is the length in
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hexadecimal.
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Search for "length ". not just "Length", as we skip past "Length ", not
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just "Length", so if we assume we found "Length " but only found
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"Length", we'd skip past the end of the string.
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While we're at it, fail if we don't find a length field, rather than
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just blithely acting as if the packet length were zero.
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Fixes #19083.
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://gitlab.com/wireshark/wireshark/-/commit/db5135826de3a5fdb3618225c2ff02f4207012ca]
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CVE: CVE-2023-2856
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Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <hprajapati@mvista.com>
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---
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wiretap/vms.c | 9 ++++++++-
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1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/wiretap/vms.c b/wiretap/vms.c
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index 0aa83ea..5f5fdbb 100644
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--- a/wiretap/vms.c
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+++ b/wiretap/vms.c
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@@ -318,6 +318,7 @@ parse_vms_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_in
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{
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char line[VMS_LINE_LENGTH + 1];
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int num_items_scanned;
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+ gboolean have_pkt_len = FALSE;
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guint32 pkt_len = 0;
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int pktnum;
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int csec = 101;
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@@ -374,7 +375,7 @@ parse_vms_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_in
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return FALSE;
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}
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}
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- if ( (! pkt_len) && (p = strstr(line, "Length"))) {
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+ if ( (! have_pkt_len) && (p = strstr(line, "Length "))) {
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p += sizeof("Length ");
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while (*p && ! g_ascii_isdigit(*p))
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p++;
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@@ -390,9 +391,15 @@ parse_vms_packet(FILE_T fh, wtap_rec *rec, Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_in
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*err_info = g_strdup_printf("vms: Length field '%s' not valid", p);
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return FALSE;
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}
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+ have_pkt_len = TRUE;
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break;
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}
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} while (! isdumpline(line));
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+ if (! have_pkt_len) {
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+ *err = WTAP_ERR_BAD_FILE;
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+ *err_info = g_strdup_printf("vms: Length field not found");
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+ return FALSE;
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+ }
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if (pkt_len > WTAP_MAX_PACKET_SIZE_STANDARD) {
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/*
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* Probably a corrupt capture file; return an error,
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--
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2.25.1
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@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ SRC_URI += " \
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file://0003-bison-Remove-line-directives.patch \
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file://0004-lemon-Remove-line-directives.patch \
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file://CVE-2022-3190.patch \
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file://CVE-2023-2855.patch \
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file://CVE-2023-2856.patch \
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"
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UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://1.as.dl.wireshark.org/src"
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