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krb5: fix CVE-2014-5351
The kadm5_randkey_principal_3 function in lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13 sends old keys in a response to a -randkey -keepold request, which allows remote authentic- ated users to forge tickets by leveraging administrative access. This back-ported patch fixes CVE-2014-5351. Signed-off-by: Wenzong Fan <wenzong.fan@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com>
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From af0ed4df4dfae762ab5fb605f5a0c8f59cb4f6ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>
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Date: Thu, 21 Aug 2014 13:52:07 -0400
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Subject: [PATCH] Return only new keys in randkey [CVE-2014-5351]
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In kadmind's randkey operation, if a client specifies the keepold
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flag, do not include the preserved old keys in the response.
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CVE-2014-5351:
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An authenticated remote attacker can retrieve the current keys for a
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service principal when generating a new set of keys for that
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principal. The attacker needs to be authenticated as a user who has
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the elevated privilege for randomizing the keys of other principals.
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Normally, when a Kerberos administrator randomizes the keys of a
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service principal, kadmind returns only the new keys. This prevents
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an administrator who lacks legitimate privileged access to a service
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from forging tickets to authenticate to that service. If the
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"keepold" flag to the kadmin randkey RPC operation is true, kadmind
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retains the old keys in the KDC database as intended, but also
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unexpectedly returns the old keys to the client, which exposes the
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service to ticket forgery attacks from the administrator.
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A mitigating factor is that legitimate clients of the affected service
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will start failing to authenticate to the service once they begin to
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receive service tickets encrypted in the new keys. The affected
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service will be unable to decrypt the newly issued tickets, possibly
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alerting the legitimate administrator of the affected service.
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CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
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[tlyu@mit.edu: CVE description and CVSS score]
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ticket: 8018 (new)
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target_version: 1.13
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tags: pullup
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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---
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src/lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++---
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1 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c b/lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c
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index 5d358bd..d4e74cc 100644
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--- a/lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c
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+++ b/lib/kadm5/srv/svr_principal.c
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@@ -344,6 +344,20 @@ check_1_6_dummy(kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
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*passptr = NULL;
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}
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+/* Return the number of keys with the newest kvno. Assumes that all key data
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+ * with the newest kvno are at the front of the key data array. */
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+static int
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+count_new_keys(int n_key_data, krb5_key_data *key_data)
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+{
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+ int n;
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+
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+ for (n = 1; n < n_key_data; n++) {
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+ if (key_data[n - 1].key_data_kvno != key_data[n].key_data_kvno)
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+ return n;
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+ }
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+ return n_key_data;
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+}
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+
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kadm5_ret_t
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kadm5_create_principal(void *server_handle,
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kadm5_principal_ent_t entry, long mask,
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@@ -1593,7 +1607,7 @@ kadm5_randkey_principal_3(void *server_handle,
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osa_princ_ent_rec adb;
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krb5_int32 now;
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kadm5_policy_ent_rec pol;
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- int ret, last_pwd;
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+ int ret, last_pwd, n_new_keys;
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krb5_boolean have_pol = FALSE;
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kadm5_server_handle_t handle = server_handle;
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krb5_keyblock *act_mkey;
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@@ -1686,8 +1700,9 @@ kadm5_randkey_principal_3(void *server_handle,
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kdb->fail_auth_count = 0;
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if (keyblocks) {
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- ret = decrypt_key_data(handle->context,
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- kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data,
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+ /* Return only the new keys added by krb5_dbe_crk. */
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+ n_new_keys = count_new_keys(kdb->n_key_data, kdb->key_data);
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+ ret = decrypt_key_data(handle->context, n_new_keys, kdb->key_data,
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keyblocks, n_keys);
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if (ret)
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goto done;
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--
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1.7.4.1
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@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ inherit autotools-brokensep binconfig perlnative
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SHRT_VER = "${@oe.utils.trim_version("${PV}", 2)}"
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SRC_URI = "http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/dist/${BPN}/${SHRT_VER}/${BP}-signed.tar \
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file://0001-aclocal-Add-parameter-to-disable-keyutils-detection.patch \
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file://0001-Return-only-new-keys-in-randkey-CVE-2014-5351.patch \
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file://debian-suppress-usr-lib-in-krb5-config.patch;striplevel=2 \
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file://crosscompile_nm.patch \
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file://etc/init.d/krb5-kdc \
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