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hostapd: fix WPA2 key replay security bug

Browse Source 
Note, hostapd and wpa_supplicant use the same sources. This commit uses the same
patch than OpenEmbedded-core commit 1d92cb1a20135cfffff9f94a6633ec0840518738 in
morty branch.

Signed-off-by: Isaac Hermida <isaac.hermida@digi.com>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Isaac Hermida 2017-11-02 13:58:50 +01:00 committed by Armin Kuster
parent 6bdb28523b
commit 5361ddf67b
2 changed files with 940 additions and 0 deletions
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939
meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd/key-replay-cve-multiple.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,939 @@
The WPA2 four-way handshake protocol is vulnerable to replay attacks which can
result in unauthenticated clients gaining access to the network.
Backport a number of patches from upstream to fix this.
CVE: CVE-2017-13077
CVE: CVE-2017-13078
CVE: CVE-2017-13079
CVE: CVE-2017-13080
CVE: CVE-2017-13081
CVE: CVE-2017-13082
CVE: CVE-2017-13086
CVE: CVE-2017-13087
CVE: CVE-2017-13088
Thanks to Wind River for the backport from upstream master to wpa_supplicant
2.5.
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@intel.com>
From 9a4a0f78bb2ad516d4a295fb5d042f8a61bd3f47 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 10:13:17 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 1/7] hostapd: Avoid key reinstallation in FT handshake
Do not reinstall TK to the driver during Reassociation Response frame
processing if the first attempt of setting the TK succeeded. This avoids
issues related to clearing the TX/RX PN that could result in reusing
same PN values for transmitted frames (e.g., due to CCM nonce reuse and
also hitting replay protection on the receiver) and accepting replayed
frames on RX side.
This issue was introduced by the commit
0e84c25434e6a1f283c7b4e62e483729085b78d2 ('FT: Fix PTK configuration in
authenticator') which allowed wpa_ft_install_ptk() to be called multiple
times with the same PTK. While the second configuration attempt is
needed with some drivers, it must be done only if the first attempt
failed.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
---
src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 9 +++++++++
src/ap/wpa_auth.h | 3 ++-
src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c | 10 ++++++++++
src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
index 2760a3f..b38a64d 100644
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
@@ -1740,6 +1740,9 @@ int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event)
#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
+ case WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED:
+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
+ return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
@@ -3208,6 +3211,12 @@ int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
return sm->wpa;
}
+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+{
+ if (!sm || !wpa_key_mgmt_ft(sm->wpa_key_mgmt))
+ return 0;
+ return sm->tk_already_set;
+}
int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry)
diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
index fd04f16..3e53461 100644
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.h
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
u8 *data, size_t data_len);
enum wpa_event {
WPA_AUTH, WPA_ASSOC, WPA_DISASSOC, WPA_DEAUTH, WPA_REAUTH,
- WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT
+ WPA_REAUTH_EAPOL, WPA_ASSOC_FT, WPA_DRV_STA_REMOVED
};
void wpa_remove_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_sm_event(struct wpa_state_machine *sm, enum wpa_event event);
@@ -271,6 +271,7 @@ int wpa_auth_pairwise_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_get_pairwise(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_sta_key_mgmt(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_sta_wpa_version(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
+int wpa_auth_sta_ft_tk_already_set(struct wpa_state_machine *sm);
int wpa_auth_sta_clear_pmksa(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *entry);
struct rsn_pmksa_cache_entry *
diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
index eeaffbf..f8f5dbe 100644
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_ft.c
@@ -780,6 +780,14 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
return;
}
+ if (sm->tk_already_set) {
+ /* Must avoid TK reconfiguration to prevent clearing of TX/RX
+ * PN in the driver */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
+ "FT: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
+ return;
+ }
+
/* FIX: add STA entry to kernel/driver here? The set_key will fail
* most likely without this.. At the moment, STA entry is added only
* after association has been completed. This function will be called
@@ -792,6 +800,7 @@ void wpa_ft_install_ptk(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
/* FIX: MLME-SetProtection.Request(TA, Tx_Rx) */
sm->pairwise_set = TRUE;
+ sm->tk_already_set = TRUE;
}
@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ static int wpa_ft_process_auth_req(struct wpa_state_machine *sm,
sm->pairwise = pairwise;
sm->PTK_valid = TRUE;
+ sm->tk_already_set = FALSE;
wpa_ft_install_ptk(sm);
buflen = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
index 57b098f..234d84c 100644
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth_i.h
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct wpa_state_machine {
struct wpa_ptk PTK;
Boolean PTK_valid;
Boolean pairwise_set;
+ Boolean tk_already_set;
int keycount;
Boolean Pair;
struct wpa_key_replay_counter {
--
1.9.1
From d0d1adad8792ae948743031543db8839f83db829 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 13:18:59 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 2/7] Prevent reinstallation of an already in-use group key
Track the current GTK and IGTK that is in use and when receiving a
(possibly retransmitted) Group Message 1 or WNM-Sleep Mode Response, do
not install the given key if it is already in use. This prevents an
attacker from trying to trick the client into resetting or lowering the
sequence counter associated to the group key.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
---
src/common/wpa_common.h | 11 +++++
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 119 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 4 ++
3 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
index c08f651..21e13da 100644
--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
@@ -215,6 +215,17 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
size_t tk_len;
};
+struct wpa_gtk {
+ u8 gtk[WPA_GTK_MAX_LEN];
+ size_t gtk_len;
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+struct wpa_igtk {
+ u8 igtk[WPA_IGTK_MAX_LEN];
+ size_t igtk_len;
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
/* WPA IE version 1
* 00-50-f2:1 (OUI:OUI type)
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
index a9f255e..eab7151 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -697,6 +697,15 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
u8 gtk_buf[32];
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+ if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
+ gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Group Key", gd->gtk, gd->gtk_len);
wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
"WPA: Installing GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
@@ -731,6 +740,9 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
}
os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -801,6 +813,47 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
+{
+ size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
+ u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
+
+ /* Detect possible key reinstallation */
+ if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
+ keyidx);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: IGTK keyid %d pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+ keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK", igtk->igtk, len);
+ if (keyidx > 4095) {
+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+ "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
+ broadcast_ether_addr,
+ keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
+ igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
+ wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
+ "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
+
static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
struct wpa_eapol_ie_parse *ie)
@@ -812,30 +865,14 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
if (ie->igtk) {
size_t len;
const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
- u16 keyidx;
+
len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
if (ie->igtk_len != WPA_IGTK_KDE_PREFIX_LEN + len)
return -1;
+
igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
- wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK keyid %d "
- "pn %02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
- keyidx, MAC2STR(igtk->pn));
- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: IGTK",
- igtk->igtk, len);
- if (keyidx > 4095) {
- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
- "WPA: Invalid IGTK KeyID %d", keyidx);
- return -1;
- }
- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
- broadcast_ether_addr,
- keyidx, 0, igtk->pn, sizeof(igtk->pn),
- igtk->igtk, len) < 0) {
- wpa_msg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_WARNING,
- "WPA: Failed to configure IGTK to the driver");
- return -1;
- }
+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ return -1;
}
return 0;
@@ -2251,7 +2288,7 @@ void wpa_sm_deinit(struct wpa_sm *sm)
*/
void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
{
- int clear_ptk = 1;
+ int clear_keys = 1;
if (sm == NULL)
return;
@@ -2277,11 +2314,11 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
/* Prepare for the next transition */
wpa_ft_prepare_auth_request(sm, NULL);
- clear_ptk = 0;
+ clear_keys = 0;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
- if (clear_ptk) {
+ if (clear_keys) {
/*
* IEEE 802.11, 8.4.10: Delete PTK SA on (re)association if
* this is not part of a Fast BSS Transition.
@@ -2291,6 +2328,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
sm->tptk_set = 0;
os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
@@ -2807,6 +2848,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
os_memset(sm->pmk, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk));
os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
os_memset(sm->pmk_r0, 0, sizeof(sm->pmk_r0));
@@ -2879,29 +2924,11 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
} else if (subelem_id == WNM_SLEEP_SUBELEM_IGTK) {
- struct wpa_igtk_kde igd;
- u16 keyidx;
-
- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
- keylen = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
- os_memcpy(igd.keyid, buf + 2, 2);
- os_memcpy(igd.pn, buf + 4, 6);
-
- keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igd.keyid);
- os_memcpy(igd.igtk, buf + 10, keylen);
-
- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install IGTK (WNM SLEEP)",
- igd.igtk, keylen);
- if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, wpa_cipher_to_alg(sm->mgmt_group_cipher),
- broadcast_ether_addr,
- keyidx, 0, igd.pn, sizeof(igd.pn),
- igd.igtk, keylen) < 0) {
- wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the IGTK in "
- "WNM mode");
- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
- return -1;
- }
- os_memset(&igd, 0, sizeof(igd));
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
+
+ igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ return -1;
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
} else {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Unknown element id");
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
index 965a9c1..27b6123 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
u8 rx_replay_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
int rx_replay_counter_set;
u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
+ struct wpa_gtk gtk;
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
+ struct wpa_igtk igtk;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
--
1.9.1
From 76c0d1a21f0ebf00119e50bc57776d393ee4a30d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 17:31:46 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 3/7] Extend protection of GTK/IGTK reinstallation of WNM-Sleep
Mode cases
This extends the protection to track last configured GTK/IGTK value
separately from EAPOL-Key frames and WNM-Sleep Mode frames to cover a
corner case where these two different mechanisms may get used when the
GTK/IGTK has changed and tracking a single value is not sufficient to
detect a possible key reconfiguration.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
---
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
index eab7151..e7b5ca8 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -692,14 +692,17 @@ struct wpa_gtk_data {
static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
const struct wpa_gtk_data *gd,
- const u8 *key_rsc)
+ const u8 *key_rsc, int wnm_sleep)
{
const u8 *_gtk = gd->gtk;
u8 gtk_buf[32];
/* Detect possible key reinstallation */
- if (sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
- os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) {
+ if ((sm->gtk.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len) == 0) ||
+ (sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len == (size_t) gd->gtk_len &&
+ os_memcmp(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len) == 0)) {
wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
"WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use GTK to the driver (keyidx=%d tx=%d len=%d)",
gd->keyidx, gd->tx, gd->gtk_len);
@@ -740,8 +743,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
}
os_memset(gtk_buf, 0, sizeof(gtk_buf));
- sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
- os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
+ if (wnm_sleep) {
+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk, gd->gtk,
+ sm->gtk_wnm_sleep.gtk_len);
+ } else {
+ sm->gtk.gtk_len = gd->gtk_len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->gtk.gtk, gd->gtk, sm->gtk.gtk_len);
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -800,7 +809,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
(wpa_supplicant_check_group_cipher(sm, sm->group_cipher,
gtk_len, gtk_len,
&gd.key_rsc_len, &gd.alg) ||
- wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc))) {
+ wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0))) {
wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
"RSN: Failed to install GTK");
os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
@@ -815,14 +824,18 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_pairwise_gtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
- const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk)
+ const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk,
+ int wnm_sleep)
{
size_t len = wpa_cipher_key_len(sm->mgmt_group_cipher);
u16 keyidx = WPA_GET_LE16(igtk->keyid);
/* Detect possible key reinstallation */
- if (sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
- os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) {
+ if ((sm->igtk.igtk_len == len &&
+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len) == 0) ||
+ (sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len == len &&
+ os_memcmp(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len) == 0)) {
wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
"WPA: Not reinstalling already in-use IGTK to the driver (keyidx=%d)",
keyidx);
@@ -847,8 +860,14 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
return -1;
}
- sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
- os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
+ if (wnm_sleep) {
+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len = len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk, igtk->igtk,
+ sm->igtk_wnm_sleep.igtk_len);
+ } else {
+ sm->igtk.igtk_len = len;
+ os_memcpy(sm->igtk.igtk, igtk->igtk, sm->igtk.igtk_len);
+ }
return 0;
}
@@ -871,7 +890,7 @@ static int ieee80211w_set_keys(struct wpa_sm *sm,
return -1;
igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) ie->igtk;
- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 0) < 0)
return -1;
}
@@ -1520,7 +1539,7 @@ static void wpa_supplicant_process_1_of_2(struct wpa_sm *sm,
if (ret)
goto failed;
- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc) ||
+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key->key_rsc, 0) ||
wpa_supplicant_send_2_of_2(sm, key, ver, key_info))
goto failed;
os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
@@ -2329,8 +2348,10 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_assoc(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *bssid)
sm->tptk_set = 0;
os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
}
@@ -2849,8 +2870,10 @@ void wpa_sm_drop_sa(struct wpa_sm *sm)
os_memset(&sm->ptk, 0, sizeof(sm->ptk));
os_memset(&sm->tptk, 0, sizeof(sm->tptk));
os_memset(&sm->gtk, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk));
+ os_memset(&sm->gtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->gtk_wnm_sleep));
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
os_memset(&sm->igtk, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk));
+ os_memset(&sm->igtk_wnm_sleep, 0, sizeof(sm->igtk_wnm_sleep));
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
os_memset(sm->xxkey, 0, sizeof(sm->xxkey));
@@ -2915,7 +2938,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Install GTK (WNM SLEEP)",
gd.gtk, gd.gtk_len);
- if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc)) {
+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_gtk(sm, &gd, key_rsc, 1)) {
os_memset(&gd, 0, sizeof(gd));
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "Failed to install the GTK in "
"WNM mode");
@@ -2927,7 +2950,7 @@ int wpa_wnmsleep_install_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, u8 subelem_id, u8 *buf)
const struct wpa_igtk_kde *igtk;
igtk = (const struct wpa_igtk_kde *) (buf + 2);
- if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk) < 0)
+ if (wpa_supplicant_install_igtk(sm, igtk, 1) < 0)
return -1;
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
} else {
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
index 27b6123..51753ee 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@ struct wpa_sm {
int rx_replay_counter_set;
u8 request_counter[WPA_REPLAY_COUNTER_LEN];
struct wpa_gtk gtk;
+ struct wpa_gtk gtk_wnm_sleep;
#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
struct wpa_igtk igtk;
+ struct wpa_igtk igtk_wnm_sleep;
#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
struct eapol_sm *eapol; /* EAPOL state machine from upper level code */
--
1.9.1
From dc0d33ee697d016f14d0b6f3330720de2dfa9ad8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 17:55:19 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 4/7] Prevent installation of an all-zero TK
Properly track whether a PTK has already been installed to the driver
and the TK part cleared from memory. This prevents an attacker from
trying to trick the client into installing an all-zero TK.
Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@cs.kuleuven.be>
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
---
src/common/wpa_common.h | 1 +
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 7 +++++++
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/common/wpa_common.h b/src/common/wpa_common.h
index 21e13da..a04e759 100644
--- a/src/common/wpa_common.h
+++ b/src/common/wpa_common.h
@@ -213,6 +213,7 @@ struct wpa_ptk {
size_t kck_len;
size_t kek_len;
size_t tk_len;
+ int installed; /* 1 if key has already been installed to driver */
};
struct wpa_gtk {
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
index e7b5ca8..cb69b67 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -605,6 +605,12 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
const u8 *key_rsc;
u8 null_rsc[8] = { 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 };
+ if (sm->ptk.installed) {
+ wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
+ "WPA: Do not re-install same PTK to the driver");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
wpa_dbg(sm->ctx->msg_ctx, MSG_DEBUG,
"WPA: Installing PTK to the driver");
@@ -643,6 +649,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_install_ptk(struct wpa_sm *sm,
/* TK is not needed anymore in supplicant */
os_memset(sm->ptk.tk, 0, WPA_TK_MAX_LEN);
+ sm->ptk.installed = 1;
if (sm->wpa_ptk_rekey) {
eloop_cancel_timeout(wpa_sm_rekey_ptk, sm, NULL);
--
1.9.1
From 9831007c38f18cd70a077fccc22c836100867138 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 19:45:13 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 5/7] Fix PTK rekeying to generate a new ANonce
The Authenticator state machine path for PTK rekeying ended up bypassing
the AUTHENTICATION2 state where a new ANonce is generated when going
directly to the PTKSTART state since there is no need to try to
determine the PMK again in such a case. This is far from ideal since the
new PTK would depend on a new nonce only from the supplicant.
Fix this by generating a new ANonce when moving to the PTKSTART state
for the purpose of starting new 4-way handshake to rekey PTK.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
---
src/ap/wpa_auth.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
index b38a64d..c603b1b 100644
--- a/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
+++ b/src/ap/wpa_auth.c
@@ -1895,6 +1895,20 @@ SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2)
sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
}
+static int wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(struct wpa_state_machine *sm)
+{
+ if (random_get_bytes(sm->ANonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
+ "WPA: Failed to get random data for ANonce");
+ sm->Disconnect = TRUE;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "WPA: Assign new ANonce", sm->ANonce,
+ WPA_NONCE_LEN);
+ sm->TimeoutCtr = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
SM_STATE(WPA_PTK, INITPMK)
{
@@ -2417,9 +2431,12 @@ SM_STEP(WPA_PTK)
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION);
else if (sm->ReAuthenticationRequest)
SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, AUTHENTICATION2);
- else if (sm->PTKRequest)
- SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
- else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
+ else if (sm->PTKRequest) {
+ if (wpa_auth_sm_ptk_update(sm) < 0)
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, DISCONNECTED);
+ else
+ SM_ENTER(WPA_PTK, PTKSTART);
+ } else switch (sm->wpa_ptk_state) {
case WPA_PTK_INITIALIZE:
break;
case WPA_PTK_DISCONNECT:
--
1.9.1
From 7ec70b3c5a5e32f7687999ef21c608524dcf35b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 20:09:26 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 6/7] TDLS: Reject TPK-TK reconfiguration
Do not try to reconfigure the same TPK-TK to the driver after it has
been successfully configured. This is an explicit check to avoid issues
related to resetting the TX/RX packet number. There was already a check
for this for TPK M2 (retries of that message are ignored completely), so
that behavior does not get modified.
For TPK M3, the TPK-TK could have been reconfigured, but that was
followed by immediate teardown of the link due to an issue in updating
the STA entry. Furthermore, for TDLS with any real security (i.e.,
ignoring open/WEP), the TPK message exchange is protected on the AP path
and simple replay attacks are not feasible.
As an additional corner case, make sure the local nonce gets updated if
the peer uses a very unlikely "random nonce" of all zeros.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
---
src/rsn_supp/tdls.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
index 722c20a..0878c62 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/tdls.c
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@ struct wpa_tdls_peer {
u8 tk[16]; /* TPK-TK; assuming only CCMP will be used */
} tpk;
int tpk_set;
+ int tk_set; /* TPK-TK configured to the driver */
int tpk_success;
int tpk_in_progress;
@@ -192,6 +193,20 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
u8 rsc[6];
enum wpa_alg alg;
+ if (peer->tk_set) {
+ /*
+ * This same TPK-TK has already been configured to the driver
+ * and this new configuration attempt (likely due to an
+ * unexpected retransmitted frame) would result in clearing
+ * the TX/RX sequence number which can break security, so must
+ * not allow that to happen.
+ */
+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "TDLS: TPK-TK for the peer " MACSTR
+ " has already been configured to the driver - do not reconfigure",
+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
os_memset(rsc, 0, 6);
switch (peer->cipher) {
@@ -209,12 +224,15 @@ static int wpa_tdls_set_key(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
return -1;
}
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Configure pairwise key for peer " MACSTR,
+ MAC2STR(peer->addr));
if (wpa_sm_set_key(sm, alg, peer->addr, -1, 1,
rsc, sizeof(rsc), peer->tpk.tk, key_len) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_WARNING, "TDLS: Failed to set TPK to the "
"driver");
return -1;
}
+ peer->tk_set = 1;
return 0;
}
@@ -690,7 +708,7 @@ static void wpa_tdls_peer_clear(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer)
peer->cipher = 0;
peer->qos_info = 0;
peer->wmm_capable = 0;
- peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
+ peer->tk_set = peer->tpk_set = peer->tpk_success = 0;
peer->chan_switch_enabled = 0;
os_memset(&peer->tpk, 0, sizeof(peer->tpk));
os_memset(peer->inonce, 0, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
@@ -1153,6 +1171,7 @@ skip_rsnie:
wpa_tdls_peer_free(sm, peer);
return -1;
}
+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
wpa_hexdump(MSG_DEBUG, "TDLS: Initiator Nonce for TPK handshake",
peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
os_memcpy(ftie->Snonce, peer->inonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
@@ -1744,6 +1763,17 @@ static int wpa_tdls_addset_peer(struct wpa_sm *sm, struct wpa_tdls_peer *peer,
peer->supp_oper_classes_len);
}
+static int tdls_nonce_set(const u8 *nonce)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < WPA_NONCE_LEN; i++) {
+ if (nonce[i])
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
static int wpa_tdls_process_tpk_m1(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *src_addr,
const u8 *buf, size_t len)
@@ -1998,7 +2028,8 @@ skip_rsn:
peer->rsnie_i_len = kde.rsn_ie_len;
peer->cipher = cipher;
- if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0) {
+ if (os_memcmp(peer->inonce, ftie->Snonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN) != 0 ||
+ !tdls_nonce_set(peer->inonce)) {
/*
* There is no point in updating the RNonce for every obtained
* TPK M1 frame (e.g., retransmission due to timeout) with the
@@ -2014,6 +2045,7 @@ skip_rsn:
"TDLS: Failed to get random data for responder nonce");
goto error;
}
+ peer->tk_set = 0; /* A new nonce results in a new TK */
}
#if 0
--
1.9.1
From 642f5eadf775b41bf3ddd8ffe77c33e785bda48f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Oct 2017 20:36:56 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 7/7] FT: Do not allow multiple Reassociation Response frames
The driver is expected to not report a second association event without
the station having explicitly request a new association. As such, this
case should not be reachable. However, since reconfiguring the same
pairwise or group keys to the driver could result in nonce reuse issues,
be extra careful here and do an additional state check to avoid this
even if the local driver ends up somehow accepting an unexpected
Reassociation Response frame.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Upstream-Status: Backport
Signed-off-by: Haiqing Bai <Haiqing.Bai@windriver.com>
---
src/rsn_supp/wpa.c | 3 +++
src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c | 8 ++++++++
src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
index cb69b67..05e5168 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa.c
@@ -2391,6 +2391,9 @@ void wpa_sm_notify_disassoc(struct wpa_sm *sm)
#ifdef CONFIG_TDLS
wpa_tdls_disassoc(sm);
#endif /* CONFIG_TDLS */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211R
+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211R */
/* Keys are not needed in the WPA state machine anymore */
wpa_sm_drop_sa(sm);
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
index 205793e..d45bb45 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_ft.c
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ static u8 * wpa_ft_gen_req_ies(struct wpa_sm *sm, size_t *len,
u16 capab;
sm->ft_completed = 0;
+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 0;
buf_len = 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_mdie) + 2 + sizeof(struct rsn_ftie) +
2 + sm->r0kh_id_len + ric_ies_len + 100;
@@ -681,6 +682,11 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
return -1;
}
+ if (sm->ft_reassoc_completed) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Reassociation has already been completed for this FT protocol instance - ignore unexpected retransmission");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (wpa_ft_parse_ies(ies, ies_len, &parse) < 0) {
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "FT: Failed to parse IEs");
return -1;
@@ -781,6 +787,8 @@ int wpa_ft_validate_reassoc_resp(struct wpa_sm *sm, const u8 *ies,
return -1;
}
+ sm->ft_reassoc_completed = 1;
+
if (wpa_ft_process_gtk_subelem(sm, parse.gtk, parse.gtk_len) < 0)
return -1;
diff --git a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
index 51753ee..85cc862 100644
--- a/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
+++ b/src/rsn_supp/wpa_i.h
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ struct wpa_sm {
size_t r0kh_id_len;
u8 r1kh_id[FT_R1KH_ID_LEN];
int ft_completed;
+ int ft_reassoc_completed;
int over_the_ds_in_progress;
u8 target_ap[ETH_ALEN]; /* over-the-DS target AP */
int set_ptk_after_assoc;
--
1.9.1

1
meta-oe/recipes-connectivity/hostapd/hostapd_2.5.bb
View File

@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = " \
file://init \
file://hostapd.service \
file://0001-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase.patch \
file://key-replay-cve-multiple.patch \
"
S = "${WORKDIR}/hostapd-${PV}"