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proftpd: CVE-2016-3125
The mod_tls module in ProFTPD before 1.3.5b and 1.3.6 before 1.3.6rc2 does not properly handle the TLSDHParamFile directive, which might cause a weaker than intended Diffie-Hellman (DH) key to be used and consequently allow attackers to have unspecified impact via unknown vectors. http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2016-3125 Signed-off-by: Catalin Enache <catalin.enache@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Jansa <Martin.Jansa@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Joe MacDonald <joe_macdonald@mentor.com> Signed-off-by: Otavio Salvador <otavio@ossystems.com.br> Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
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From 7a8f683cedf9b0d1024a80362693c9f8b93a0f2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: TJ Saunders <tj@castaglia.org>
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Date: Thu, 10 Mar 2016 15:07:58 -0800
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Subject: [PATCH] Backport of fix for Bug#4230 to 1.3.5 branch.
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Upstream-Status: Backport
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CVE: CVE-2016-3125
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Author: TJ Saunders <tj@castaglia.org>
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Signed-off-by: Catalin Enache <catalin.enache@windriver.com>
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---
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contrib/mod_tls.c | 167 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
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1 file changed, 147 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/contrib/mod_tls.c b/contrib/mod_tls.c
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index df92658..5883cc7 100644
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--- a/contrib/mod_tls.c
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+++ b/contrib/mod_tls.c
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@@ -411,6 +411,13 @@ static int tls_required_on_ctrl = 0;
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static int tls_required_on_data = 0;
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static unsigned char *tls_authenticated = NULL;
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+/* Define the minimum DH group length we allow (unless the AllowWeakDH
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+ * TLSOption is used). Ideally this would be 2048, per https://weakdh.org,
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+ * but for compatibility with older Java versions, which only support up to
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+ * 1024, we'll use 1024. For now.
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+ */
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+#define TLS_DH_MIN_LEN 1024
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+
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/* mod_tls session flags */
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#define TLS_SESS_ON_CTRL 0x0001
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#define TLS_SESS_ON_DATA 0x0002
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@@ -438,6 +445,7 @@ static unsigned char *tls_authenticated = NULL;
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#define TLS_OPT_USE_IMPLICIT_SSL 0x0200
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#define TLS_OPT_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATIONS 0x0400
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#define TLS_OPT_VERIFY_CERT_CN 0x0800
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+#define TLS_OPT_ALLOW_WEAK_DH 0x1000
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/* mod_tls SSCN modes */
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#define TLS_SSCN_MODE_SERVER 0
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@@ -2417,24 +2425,139 @@ static int tls_ctrl_renegotiate_cb(CALLBACK_FRAME) {
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static DH *tls_dh_cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength) {
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DH *dh = NULL;
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+ EVP_PKEY *pkey;
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+ int pkeylen = 0, use_pkeylen = FALSE;
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+
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+ /* OpenSSL will only ever call us (currently) with a keylen of 512 or 1024;
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+ * see the SSL_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH macro in ssl_locl.h. Sigh.
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+ *
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+ * Thus we adjust the DH parameter length according to the size of the
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+ * RSA/DSA private key used for the current connection.
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+ *
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+ * NOTE: This MAY cause interoperability issues with some clients, notably
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+ * Java 7 (and earlier) clients, since Java 7 and earlier supports
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+ * Diffie-Hellman only up to 1024 bits. More sighs. To deal with these
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+ * clients, then, you need to configure a certificate/key of 1024 bits.
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+ */
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+ pkey = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl);
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+ if (pkey != NULL) {
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+ if (EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_RSA ||
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+ EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type) == EVP_PKEY_DSA) {
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+ pkeylen = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey);
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+
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+ if (pkeylen < TLS_DH_MIN_LEN) {
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+ if (!(tls_opts & TLS_OPT_ALLOW_WEAK_DH)) {
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+ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
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+ "certificate private key length %d less than %d bits, using %d "
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+ "(see AllowWeakDH TLSOption)", pkeylen, TLS_DH_MIN_LEN,
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+ TLS_DH_MIN_LEN);
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+ pkeylen = TLS_DH_MIN_LEN;
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ if (pkeylen != keylen) {
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+ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 13,
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+ "adjusted DH parameter length from %d to %d bits", keylen, pkeylen);
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+ use_pkeylen = TRUE;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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if (tls_tmp_dhs != NULL &&
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tls_tmp_dhs->nelts > 0) {
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register unsigned int i;
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- DH **dhs;
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+ DH *best_dh = NULL, **dhs;
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+ int best_dhlen = 0;
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dhs = tls_tmp_dhs->elts;
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+
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+ /* Search the configured list of DH parameters twice: once for any sizes
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+ * matching the actual requested size (usually 1024), and once for any
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+ * matching the certificate private key size (pkeylen).
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+ *
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+ * This behavior allows site admins to configure a TLSDHParamFile that
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+ * contains 1024-bit parameters, for e.g. Java 7 (and earlier) clients.
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+ */
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+
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+ /* Note: the keylen argument is in BITS, but DH_size() returns the number
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+ * of BYTES.
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+ */
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for (i = 0; i < tls_tmp_dhs->nelts; i++) {
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- /* Note: the keylength argument is in BITS, but DH_size() returns
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- * the number of BYTES.
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+ int dhlen;
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+
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+ dhlen = DH_size(dhs[i]) * 8;
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+ if (dhlen == keylen) {
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+ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
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+ "found matching DH parameter for key length %d", keylen);
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+ return dhs[i];
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+ }
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+
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+ /* Try to find the next "best" DH to use, where "best" means
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+ * the smallest DH that is larger than the necessary keylen.
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*/
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- if (DH_size(dhs[i]) == (keylength / 8)) {
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+ if (dhlen > keylen) {
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+ if (best_dh != NULL) {
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+ if (dhlen < best_dhlen) {
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+ best_dh = dhs[i];
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+ best_dhlen = dhlen;
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+ }
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+
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+ } else {
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+ best_dh = dhs[i];
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+ best_dhlen = dhlen;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ for (i = 0; i < tls_tmp_dhs->nelts; i++) {
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+ int dhlen;
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+
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+ dhlen = DH_size(dhs[i]) * 8;
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+ if (dhlen == pkeylen) {
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+ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
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+ "found matching DH parameter for certificate private key length %d",
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+ pkeylen);
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return dhs[i];
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}
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+
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+ if (dhlen > pkeylen) {
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+ if (best_dh != NULL) {
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+ if (dhlen < best_dhlen) {
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+ best_dh = dhs[i];
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+ best_dhlen = dhlen;
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+ }
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+
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+ } else {
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+ best_dh = dhs[i];
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+ best_dhlen = dhlen;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ if (best_dh != NULL) {
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+ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
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+ "using best DH parameter for key length %d (length %d)", keylen,
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+ best_dhlen);
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+ return best_dh;
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}
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}
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- switch (keylength) {
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+ /* Still no DH parameters found? Use the built-in ones. */
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+
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+ if (keylen < TLS_DH_MIN_LEN) {
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+ if (!(tls_opts & TLS_OPT_ALLOW_WEAK_DH)) {
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+ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11,
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+ "requested key length %d less than %d bits, using %d "
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+ "(see AllowWeakDH TLSOption)", keylen, TLS_DH_MIN_LEN, TLS_DH_MIN_LEN);
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+ keylen = TLS_DH_MIN_LEN;
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ if (use_pkeylen) {
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+ keylen = pkeylen;
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+ }
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+
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+ switch (keylen) {
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case 512:
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dh = get_dh512();
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break;
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@@ -2443,32 +2566,33 @@ static DH *tls_dh_cb(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength) {
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dh = get_dh768();
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break;
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- case 1024:
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- dh = get_dh1024();
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- break;
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+ case 1024:
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+ dh = get_dh1024();
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+ break;
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- case 1536:
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- dh = get_dh1536();
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- break;
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+ case 1536:
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+ dh = get_dh1536();
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+ break;
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- case 2048:
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- dh = get_dh2048();
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- break;
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+ case 2048:
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+ dh = get_dh2048();
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+ break;
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- default:
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- tls_log("unsupported DH key length %d requested, returning 1024 bits",
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- keylength);
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- dh = get_dh1024();
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- break;
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+ default:
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+ tls_log("unsupported DH key length %d requested, returning 1024 bits",
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+ keylen);
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+ dh = get_dh1024();
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+ break;
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}
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+ pr_trace_msg(trace_channel, 11, "using builtin DH for %d bits", keylen);
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+
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/* Add this DH to the list, so that it can be freed properly later. */
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if (tls_tmp_dhs == NULL) {
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tls_tmp_dhs = make_array(session.pool, 1, sizeof(DH *));
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}
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*((DH **) push_array(tls_tmp_dhs)) = dh;
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-
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return dh;
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}
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@@ -8445,6 +8569,9 @@ MODRET set_tlsoptions(cmd_rec *cmd) {
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strcmp(cmd->argv[i], "AllowClientRenegotiations") == 0) {
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opts |= TLS_OPT_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATIONS;
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+ } else if (strcmp(cmd->argv[i], "AllowWeakDH") == 0) {
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+ opts |= TLS_OPT_ALLOW_WEAK_DH;
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+
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} else if (strcmp(cmd->argv[i], "EnableDiags") == 0) {
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opts |= TLS_OPT_ENABLE_DIAGS;
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--
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2.7.4
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@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.proftpd.org/distrib/source/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
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file://contrib.patch \
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file://build_fixup.patch \
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file://proftpd.service \
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file://CVE-2016-3125.patch \
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"
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SRC_URI[md5sum] = "b9d3092411478415b31d435f8e26d173"
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