apache: add fix for CVE-2014-0117 Security Advisory

The patch comes from upstream:
http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1610674

SECURITY (CVE-2014-0117): Fix a crash in mod_proxy.  In a reverse proxy
configuration, a remote attacker could send a carefully crafted request which
could crash a server process, resulting in denial of service.

Thanks to Marek Kroemeke working with HP's Zero Day Initiative for reporting
this issue.

Submitted by: Edward Lu, breser, covener
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <kai.kang@windriver.com>
This commit is contained in:
Kang Kai 2014-10-29 09:40:08 +08:00 committed by Paul Eggleton
parent 6aee572984
commit a4fd0b3410
2 changed files with 292 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,289 @@
apache: CVE-2014-0117
The patch comes from upstream:
http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1610674
SECURITY (CVE-2014-0117): Fix a crash in mod_proxy. In a
reverse proxy configuration, a remote attacker could send a carefully crafted
request which could crash a server process, resulting in denial of service.
Thanks to Marek Kroemeke working with HP's Zero Day Initiative for
reporting this issue.
Upstream-Status: Backport
Submitted by: Edward Lu, breser, covener
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiao <xiao.zhang@windriver.com>
---
modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 8 +++-
include/httpd.h | 17 ++++++++
modules/proxy/proxy_util.c | 67 ++++++++++++++----------------
server/util.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 143 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)
diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
index cffad2e..f11c16f 100644
--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
+++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
@@ -1362,6 +1362,7 @@ apr_status_t ap_proxy_http_process_response(apr_pool_t * p, request_rec *r,
*/
if (apr_date_checkmask(buffer, "HTTP/#.# ###*")) {
int major, minor;
+ int toclose;
major = buffer[5] - '0';
minor = buffer[7] - '0';
@@ -1470,7 +1471,12 @@ apr_status_t ap_proxy_http_process_response(apr_pool_t * p, request_rec *r,
te = apr_table_get(r->headers_out, "Transfer-Encoding");
/* strip connection listed hop-by-hop headers from response */
- backend->close = ap_proxy_clear_connection_fn(r, r->headers_out);
+ toclose = ap_proxy_clear_connection_fn(r, r->headers_out);
+ backend->close = (toclose != 0);
+ if (toclose < 0) {
+ return ap_proxyerror(r, HTTP_BAD_REQUEST,
+ "Malformed connection header");
+ }
if ((buf = apr_table_get(r->headers_out, "Content-Type"))) {
ap_set_content_type(r, apr_pstrdup(p, buf));
diff --git a/include/httpd.h b/include/httpd.h
index 36cd58d..9a2cf5c 100644
--- a/include/httpd.h
+++ b/include/httpd.h
@@ -1528,6 +1528,23 @@ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_find_etag_weak(apr_pool_t *p, const char *line, const char *t
AP_DECLARE(int) ap_find_etag_strong(apr_pool_t *p, const char *line, const char *tok);
/**
+ * Retrieve an array of tokens in the format "1#token" defined in RFC2616. Only
+ * accepts ',' as a delimiter, does not accept quoted strings, and errors on
+ * any separator.
+ * @param p The pool to allocate from
+ * @param tok The line to read tokens from
+ * @param tokens Pointer to an array of tokens. If not NULL, must be an array
+ * of char*, otherwise it will be allocated on @a p when a token is found
+ * @param skip_invalid If true, when an invalid separator is encountered, it
+ * will be ignored.
+ * @return NULL on success, an error string otherwise.
+ * @remark *tokens may be NULL on output if NULL in input and no token is found
+ */
+AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_parse_token_list_strict(apr_pool_t *p, const char *tok,
+ apr_array_header_t **tokens,
+ int skip_invalid);
+
+/**
* Retrieve a token, spacing over it and adjusting the pointer to
* the first non-white byte afterwards. Note that these tokens
* are delimited by semis and commas and can also be delimited
diff --git a/modules/proxy/proxy_util.c b/modules/proxy/proxy_util.c
index 67dc939..58daa21 100644
--- a/modules/proxy/proxy_util.c
+++ b/modules/proxy/proxy_util.c
@@ -2847,68 +2847,59 @@ PROXY_DECLARE(proxy_balancer_shared *) ap_proxy_find_balancershm(ap_slotmem_prov
typedef struct header_connection {
apr_pool_t *pool;
apr_array_header_t *array;
- const char *first;
- unsigned int closed:1;
+ const char *error;
+ int is_req;
} header_connection;
static int find_conn_headers(void *data, const char *key, const char *val)
{
header_connection *x = data;
- const char *name;
-
- do {
- while (*val == ',' || *val == ';') {
- val++;
- }
- name = ap_get_token(x->pool, &val, 0);
- if (!strcasecmp(name, "close")) {
- x->closed = 1;
- }
- if (!x->first) {
- x->first = name;
- }
- else {
- const char **elt;
- if (!x->array) {
- x->array = apr_array_make(x->pool, 4, sizeof(char *));
- }
- elt = apr_array_push(x->array);
- *elt = name;
- }
- } while (*val);
- return 1;
+ x->error = ap_parse_token_list_strict(x->pool, val, &x->array, !x->is_req);
+ return !x->error;
}
/**
* Remove all headers referred to by the Connection header.
+ * Returns -1 on error. Otherwise, returns 1 if 'Close' was seen in
+ * the Connection header tokens, and 0 if not.
*/
static int ap_proxy_clear_connection(request_rec *r, apr_table_t *headers)
{
- const char **name;
+ int closed = 0;
header_connection x;
x.pool = r->pool;
x.array = NULL;
- x.first = NULL;
- x.closed = 0;
+ x.error = NULL;
+ x.is_req = (headers == r->headers_in);
apr_table_unset(headers, "Proxy-Connection");
apr_table_do(find_conn_headers, &x, headers, "Connection", NULL);
- if (x.first) {
- /* fast path - no memory allocated for one header */
- apr_table_unset(headers, "Connection");
- apr_table_unset(headers, x.first);
+ apr_table_unset(headers, "Connection");
+
+ if (x.error) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_NOTICE, 0, r, APLOGNO()
+ "Error parsing Connection header: %s", x.error);
+ return -1;
}
+
if (x.array) {
- /* two or more headers */
- while ((name = apr_array_pop(x.array))) {
- apr_table_unset(headers, *name);
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < x.array->nelts; i++) {
+ const char *name = APR_ARRAY_IDX(x.array, i, const char *);
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO()
+ "Removing header '%s' listed in Connection header",
+ name);
+ if (!strcasecmp(name, "close")) {
+ closed = 1;
+ }
+ apr_table_unset(headers, name);
}
}
- return x.closed;
+ return closed;
}
PROXY_DECLARE(int) ap_proxy_create_hdrbrgd(apr_pool_t *p,
@@ -3095,7 +3086,9 @@ PROXY_DECLARE(int) ap_proxy_create_hdrbrgd(apr_pool_t *p,
* apr is compiled with APR_POOL_DEBUG.
*/
headers_in_copy = apr_table_copy(r->pool, r->headers_in);
- ap_proxy_clear_connection(r, headers_in_copy);
+ if (ap_proxy_clear_connection(r, headers_in_copy) < 0) {
+ return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
+ }
/* send request headers */
headers_in_array = apr_table_elts(headers_in_copy);
headers_in = (const apr_table_entry_t *) headers_in_array->elts;
diff --git a/server/util.c b/server/util.c
index e0ba5c2..541c9f0 100644
--- a/server/util.c
+++ b/server/util.c
@@ -1449,6 +1449,95 @@ AP_DECLARE(int) ap_find_etag_weak(apr_pool_t *p, const char *line,
return find_list_item(p, line, tok, AP_ETAG_WEAK);
}
+/* Grab a list of tokens of the format 1#token (from RFC7230) */
+AP_DECLARE(const char *) ap_parse_token_list_strict(apr_pool_t *p,
+ const char *str_in,
+ apr_array_header_t **tokens,
+ int skip_invalid)
+{
+ int in_leading_space = 1;
+ int in_trailing_space = 0;
+ int string_end = 0;
+ const char *tok_begin;
+ const char *cur;
+
+ if (!str_in) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ tok_begin = cur = str_in;
+
+ while (!string_end) {
+ const unsigned char c = (unsigned char)*cur;
+
+ if (!TEST_CHAR(c, T_HTTP_TOKEN_STOP) && c != '\0') {
+ /* Non-separator character; we are finished with leading
+ * whitespace. We must never have encountered any trailing
+ * whitespace before the delimiter (comma) */
+ in_leading_space = 0;
+ if (in_trailing_space) {
+ return "Encountered illegal whitespace in token";
+ }
+ }
+ else if (c == ' ' || c == '\t') {
+ /* "Linear whitespace" only includes ASCII CRLF, space, and tab;
+ * we can't get a CRLF since headers are split on them already,
+ * so only look for a space or a tab */
+ if (in_leading_space) {
+ /* We're still in leading whitespace */
+ ++tok_begin;
+ }
+ else {
+ /* We must be in trailing whitespace */
+ ++in_trailing_space;
+ }
+ }
+ else if (c == ',' || c == '\0') {
+ if (!in_leading_space) {
+ /* If we're out of the leading space, we know we've read some
+ * characters of a token */
+ if (*tokens == NULL) {
+ *tokens = apr_array_make(p, 4, sizeof(char *));
+ }
+ APR_ARRAY_PUSH(*tokens, char *) =
+ apr_pstrmemdup((*tokens)->pool, tok_begin,
+ (cur - tok_begin) - in_trailing_space);
+ }
+ /* We're allowed to have null elements, just don't add them to the
+ * array */
+
+ tok_begin = cur + 1;
+ in_leading_space = 1;
+ in_trailing_space = 0;
+ string_end = (c == '\0');
+ }
+ else {
+ /* Encountered illegal separator char */
+ if (skip_invalid) {
+ /* Skip to the next separator */
+ const char *temp;
+ temp = ap_strchr_c(cur, ',');
+ if(!temp) {
+ temp = ap_strchr_c(cur, '\0');
+ }
+
+ /* Act like we haven't seen a token so we reset */
+ cur = temp - 1;
+ in_leading_space = 1;
+ in_trailing_space = 0;
+ }
+ else {
+ return apr_psprintf(p, "Encountered illegal separator "
+ "'\\x%.2x'", (unsigned int)c);
+ }
+ }
+
+ ++cur;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/* Retrieve a token, spacing over it and returning a pointer to
* the first non-white byte afterwards. Note that these tokens
* are delimited by semis and commas; and can also be delimited
--

View File

@ -19,7 +19,9 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.apache.org/dist/httpd/httpd-${PV}.tar.bz2 \
file://0001-configure-use-pkg-config-for-PCRE-detection.patch \
file://init \
file://apache2-volatile.conf \
file://apache2.service"
file://apache2.service \
file://apache-CVE-2014-0117.patch \
"
LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=dbff5a2b542fa58854455bf1a0b94b83"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "44543dff14a4ebc1e9e2d86780507156"