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openssl: Security fix CVE-2016-0701

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CVE-2016-0701 OpenSSL: DH small subgroups

(From OE-Core rev: c5868a7cd0a28c5800dfa4be1c9d98d3de08cd12)

(From OE-Core rev: 5e73d0e88c28ca1e948f5c463b9d9d1001251a42)

Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster808@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Armin Kuster 2016-02-06 15:14:47 -08:00 committed by Richard Purdie
parent 1098a7bc0c
commit 165fa6ce62
3 changed files with 260 additions and 0 deletions
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102
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_1.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
From 878e2c5b13010329c203f309ed0c8f2113f85648 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2016 11:31:58 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Prevent small subgroup attacks on DH/DHE
Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe"
primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for
generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC
5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an
application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that
are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's
private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete
multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same DH exponent.
A simple mitigation is to ensure that y^q (mod p) == 1
CVE-2016-0701 (fix part 1 of 2)
Issue reported by Antonio Sanso.
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Upstream-Status: Backport
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/878e2c5b13010329c203f309ed0c8f2113f85648
CVE: CVE-2016-0701
Signed-of-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvisa.com>
---
crypto/dh/dh.h | 1 +
crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh.h b/crypto/dh/dh.h
index b177673..5498a9d 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh.h
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh.h
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ struct dh_st {
/* DH_check_pub_key error codes */
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL 0x01
# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE 0x02
+# define DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID 0x03
/*
* primes p where (p-1)/2 is prime too are called "safe"; we define this for
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
index 347467c..5adedc0 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_check.c
@@ -151,23 +151,38 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
{
int ok = 0;
- BIGNUM *q = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
*ret = 0;
- q = BN_new();
- if (q == NULL)
+ ctx = BN_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
- BN_set_word(q, 1);
- if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) <= 0)
+ BN_CTX_start(ctx);
+ tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ BN_set_word(tmp, 1);
+ if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
- BN_copy(q, dh->p);
- BN_sub_word(q, 1);
- if (BN_cmp(pub_key, q) >= 0)
+ BN_copy(tmp, dh->p);
+ BN_sub_word(tmp, 1);
+ if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0)
*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
+ if (dh->q != NULL) {
+ /* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */
+ if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->q, dh->p, ctx))
+ goto err;
+ if (!BN_is_one(tmp))
+ *ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
+ }
+
ok = 1;
err:
- if (q != NULL)
- BN_free(q);
+ if (ctx != NULL) {
+ BN_CTX_end(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+ }
return (ok);
}
--
2.3.5

156
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2016-0701_2.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
From c5b831f21d0d29d1e517d139d9d101763f60c9a2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 02:57:20 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Always generate DH keys for ephemeral DH cipher suites
Modified version of the commit ffaef3f15 in the master branch by Stephen
Henson. This makes the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option a no-op and always
generates a new DH key for every handshake regardless.
CVE-2016-0701 (fix part 2 or 2)
Issue reported by Antonio Sanso
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Upstream-Status: Backport
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/c5b831f21d0d29d1e517d139d9d101763f60c9a2
CVE: CVE-2016-0701 #2
Signed-of-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvisa.com>
---
doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod | 29 +++++------------------------
ssl/s3_lib.c | 14 --------------
ssl/s3_srvr.c | 17 +++--------------
ssl/ssl.h | 2 +-
4 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 53 deletions(-)
Index: openssl-1.0.2d/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
+++ openssl-1.0.2d/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback.pod
@@ -48,25 +48,8 @@ even if he gets hold of the normal (cert
only used for signing.
In order to perform a DH key exchange the server must use a DH group
-(DH parameters) and generate a DH key.
-The server will always generate a new DH key during the negotiation
-if either the DH parameters are supplied via callback or the
-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option of SSL_CTX_set_options(3) is set (or both).
-It will immediately create a DH key if DH parameters are supplied via
-SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() and SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is not set.
-In this case,
-it may happen that a key is generated on initialization without later
-being needed, while on the other hand the computer time during the
-negotiation is being saved.
-
-If "strong" primes were used to generate the DH parameters, it is not strictly
-necessary to generate a new key for each handshake but it does improve forward
-secrecy. If it is not assured that "strong" primes were used,
-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE must be used in order to prevent small subgroup
-attacks. Always using SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE has an impact on the
-computer time needed during negotiation, but it is not very large, so
-application authors/users should consider always enabling this option.
-The option is required to implement perfect forward secrecy (PFS).
+(DH parameters) and generate a DH key. The server will always generate
+a new DH key during the negotiation.
As generating DH parameters is extremely time consuming, an application
should not generate the parameters on the fly but supply the parameters.
@@ -93,10 +76,9 @@ can supply the DH parameters via a callb
Previous versions of the callback used B<is_export> and B<keylength>
parameters to control parameter generation for export and non-export
cipher suites. Modern servers that do not support export ciphersuites
-are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() in combination with
-SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE, or alternatively, use the callback but ignore
-B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply supply at least 2048-bit
-parameters in the callback.
+are advised to either use SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh() or alternatively, use
+the callback but ignore B<keylength> and B<is_export> and simply
+supply at least 2048-bit parameters in the callback.
=head1 EXAMPLES
@@ -128,7 +110,6 @@ partly left out.)
if (SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh_2048) != 1) {
/* Error. */
}
- SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE);
...
=head1 RETURN VALUES
Index: openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s3_lib.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/ssl/s3_lib.c
+++ openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s3_lib.c
@@ -3206,13 +3206,6 @@ long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long lar
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return (ret);
}
- if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
- DH_free(dh);
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- return (ret);
- }
- }
if (s->cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(s->cert->dh_tmp);
s->cert->dh_tmp = dh;
@@ -3710,13 +3703,6 @@ long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
return 0;
}
- if (!(ctx->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE)) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(new)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- DH_free(new);
- return 0;
- }
- }
if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL)
DH_free(cert->dh_tmp);
cert->dh_tmp = new;
Index: openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s3_srvr.c
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -1684,20 +1684,9 @@ int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s
}
s->s3->tmp.dh = dh;
- if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL ||
- dhp->priv_key == NULL ||
- (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) {
- if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
- } else {
- dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key);
- dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key);
- if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) {
- SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
- goto err;
- }
+ if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) {
+ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB);
+ goto err;
}
r[0] = dh->p;
r[1] = dh->g;
Index: openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/ssl.h
===================================================================
--- openssl-1.0.2d.orig/ssl/ssl.h
+++ openssl-1.0.2d/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ struct ssl_session_st {
# define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L
/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */
# define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L
-/* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */
+/* Does nothing: retained for compatibility */
# define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x00100000L
/* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */
# define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x0

2
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.2d.bb
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@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
file://0001-Add-test-for-CVE-2015-3194.patch \
file://CVE-2015-3195-Fix-leak-with-ASN.1-combine.patch \
file://CVE-2015-3197.patch \
file://CVE-2016-0701_1.patch \
file://CVE-2016-0701_2.patch \
"
SRC_URI[md5sum] = "38dd619b2e77cbac69b99f52a053d25a"