openssl: patch CVE-2024-13176

Picked [1] per link in [2].

[1] 07272b05b0
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13176

(From OE-Core rev: cb18163c11d7f8b62b829f203b00a4e14513c6cf)

Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2024-13176.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+From 07272b05b04836a762b4baa874958af51d513844 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
+Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 18:27:02 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computation
+
+There is a timing signal of around 300 nanoseconds when the top word of
+the inverted ECDSA nonce value is zero. This can happen with significant
+probability only for some of the supported elliptic curves. In particular
+the NIST P-521 curve is affected. To be able to measure this leak, the
+attacker process must either be located in the same physical computer or
+must have a very fast network connection with low latency.
+
+Attacks on ECDSA nonce are also known as Minerva attack.
+
+Fixes CVE-2024-13176
+
+Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org>
+Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com>
+(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26429)
+
+(cherry picked from commit 63c40a66c5dc287485705d06122d3a6e74a6a203)
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-13176
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/07272b05b04836a762b4baa874958af51d513844]
+Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
+---
+ crypto/bn/bn_exp.c  | 21 +++++++++++++++------
+ crypto/ec/ec_lib.c  |  7 ++++---
+ include/crypto/bn.h |  3 +++
+ 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+index 598a592ca1397..d84c7de18a6b6 100644
+--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c
+@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top,
+  * out by Colin Percival,
+  * http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/)
+  */
+-int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
++int bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                               const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
+                               BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+ {
+@@ -623,10 +623,6 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+     unsigned int t4 = 0;
+ #endif
+ 
+-    bn_check_top(a);
+-    bn_check_top(p);
+-    bn_check_top(m);
+-
+     if (!BN_is_odd(m)) {
+         ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS);
+         return 0;
+@@ -1146,7 +1142,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+             goto err;
+     } else
+ #endif
+-    if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx))
++    if (!bn_from_mont_fixed_top(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx))
+         goto err;
+     ret = 1;
+  err:
+@@ -1160,6 +1156,19 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+     return ret;
+ }
+ 
++int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
++                              const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
++                              BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
++{
++    bn_check_top(a);
++    bn_check_top(p);
++    bn_check_top(m);
++    if (!bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont))
++        return 0;
++    bn_correct_top(rr);
++    return 1;
++}
++
+ int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                          const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+ {
+diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+index b1696d93bd6dd..1f0bf1ec795fa 100644
+--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
++++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+ #include "crypto/ec.h"
++#include "crypto/bn.h"
+ #include "internal/nelem.h"
+ #include "ec_local.h"
+ 
+@@ -1262,10 +1263,10 @@ static int ec_field_inverse_mod_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
+     if (!BN_sub(e, group->order, e))
+         goto err;
+     /*-
+-     * Exponent e is public.
+-     * No need for scatter-gather or BN_FLG_CONSTTIME.
++     * Although the exponent is public we want the result to be
++     * fixed top.
+      */
+-    if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data))
++    if (!bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data))
+         goto err;
+ 
+     ret = 1;
+diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h
+index c5f328156d3a9..59a629b9f6288 100644
+--- a/include/crypto/bn.h
++++ b/include/crypto/bn.h
+@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG *words, int num_words);
+  */
+ int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b,
+                           BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx);
++int bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
++                              const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx,
++                              BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont);
+ int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,
+                          BN_CTX *ctx);
+ int bn_from_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont,

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_3.0.15.bb

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/releases/download/openssl-${PV}/op
            file://afalg.patch \
            file://0001-Configure-do-not-tweak-mips-cflags.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-9143.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-13176.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI:append:class-nativesdk = " \