diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..fa8bc542d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +From 359c9c0478406fe00e0d4c5d52bd9bf8c2ca4081 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 09:46:22 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/4] present: Fix use-after-free in present_create_notifies() + +Using the Present extension, if an error occurs while processing and +adding the notifications after presenting a pixmap, the function +present_create_notifies() will clean up and remove the notifications +it added. + +However, there are two different code paths that can lead to an error +creating the notify, one being before the notify is being added to the +list, and another one after the notify is added. + +When the error occurs before it's been added, it removes the elements up +to the last added element, instead of the actual number of elements +which were added. + +As a result, in case of error, as with an invalid window for example, it +leaves a dangling pointer to the last element, leading to a use after +free case later: + + | Invalid write of size 8 + | at 0x5361D5: present_clear_window_notifies (present_notify.c:42) + | by 0x534A56: present_destroy_window (present_screen.c:107) + | by 0x41E441: xwl_destroy_window (xwayland-window.c:1959) + | by 0x4F9EC9: compDestroyWindow (compwindow.c:622) + | by 0x51EAC4: damageDestroyWindow (damage.c:1592) + | by 0x4FDC29: DbeDestroyWindow (dbe.c:1291) + | by 0x4EAC55: FreeWindowResources (window.c:1023) + | by 0x4EAF59: DeleteWindow (window.c:1091) + | by 0x4DE59A: doFreeResource (resource.c:890) + | by 0x4DEFB2: FreeClientResources (resource.c:1156) + | by 0x4A9AFB: CloseDownClient (dispatch.c:3567) + | by 0x5DCC78: ClientReady (connection.c:603) + | Address 0x16126200 is 16 bytes inside a block of size 2,048 free'd + | at 0x4841E43: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:989) + | by 0x5363DD: present_destroy_notifies (present_notify.c:111) + | by 0x53638D: present_create_notifies (present_notify.c:100) + | by 0x5368E9: proc_present_pixmap_common (present_request.c:164) + | by 0x536A7D: proc_present_pixmap (present_request.c:189) + | by 0x536FA9: proc_present_dispatch (present_request.c:337) + | by 0x4A1E4E: Dispatch (dispatch.c:561) + | by 0x4B00F1: dix_main (main.c:284) + | by 0x42879D: main (stubmain.c:34) + | Block was alloc'd at + | at 0x48463F3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675) + | by 0x5362A1: present_create_notifies (present_notify.c:81) + | by 0x5368E9: proc_present_pixmap_common (present_request.c:164) + | by 0x536A7D: proc_present_pixmap (present_request.c:189) + | by 0x536FA9: proc_present_dispatch (present_request.c:337) + | by 0x4A1E4E: Dispatch (dispatch.c:561) + | by 0x4B00F1: dix_main (main.c:284) + | by 0x42879D: main (stubmain.c:34) + +To fix the issue, count and remove the actual number of notify elements +added in case of error. + +CVE-2025-62229, ZDI-CAN-27238 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +(cherry picked from commit 5a4286b13f631b66c20f5bc8db7b68211dcbd1d0) + +Part-of: + +CVE: CVE-2025-62229 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton +--- + present/present_notify.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/present/present_notify.c b/present/present_notify.c +index 445954998..00b3b68bd 100644 +--- a/present/present_notify.c ++++ b/present/present_notify.c +@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ present_create_notifies(ClientPtr client, int num_notifies, xPresentNotify *x_no + if (status != Success) + goto bail; + +- added = i; ++ added++; + } + return Success; + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0002-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0002-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..ed25f4b58e --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0002-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From a3d5c76ee8925ef9846c72e2327674b84e3fcdb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 15:55:06 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/4] xkb: Make the RT_XKBCLIENT resource private +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Currently, the resource in only available to the xkb.c source file. + +In preparation for the next commit, to be able to free the resources +from XkbRemoveResourceClient(), make that variable private instead. + +This is related to: + +CVE-2025-62230, ZDI-CAN-27545 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer +(cherry picked from commit 99790a2c9205a52fbbec01f21a92c9b7f4ed1d8f) + +Part-of: + +CVE: CVE-2025-62230 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton +--- + include/xkbsrv.h | 2 ++ + xkb/xkb.c | 2 +- + 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/include/xkbsrv.h b/include/xkbsrv.h +index fbb5427e1..b2766277c 100644 +--- a/include/xkbsrv.h ++++ b/include/xkbsrv.h +@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + #include "inputstr.h" + #include "events.h" + ++extern RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT; ++ + typedef struct _XkbInterest { + DeviceIntPtr dev; + ClientPtr client; +diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c +index 5131bfcdf..26d965d48 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkb.c ++++ b/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ int XkbKeyboardErrorCode; + CARD32 xkbDebugFlags = 0; + static CARD32 xkbDebugCtrls = 0; + +-static RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT; ++RESTYPE RT_XKBCLIENT = 0; + + /***====================================================================***/ + +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0003-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0003-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..f55e3d4126 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0003-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +From 32b12feb6f9f3d32532ff75c7434a7426b85e0c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 15:58:57 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 3/4] xkb: Free the XKB resource when freeing XkbInterest +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +XkbRemoveResourceClient() would free the XkbInterest data associated +with the device, but not the resource associated with it. + +As a result, when the client terminates, the resource delete function +gets called and accesses already freed memory: + + | Invalid read of size 8 + | at 0x5BC0C0: XkbRemoveResourceClient (xkbEvents.c:1047) + | by 0x5B3391: XkbClientGone (xkb.c:7094) + | by 0x4DF138: doFreeResource (resource.c:890) + | by 0x4DFB50: FreeClientResources (resource.c:1156) + | by 0x4A9A59: CloseDownClient (dispatch.c:3550) + | by 0x5E0A53: ClientReady (connection.c:601) + | by 0x5E4FEF: ospoll_wait (ospoll.c:657) + | by 0x5DC834: WaitForSomething (WaitFor.c:206) + | by 0x4A1BA5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:491) + | by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277) + | by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34) + | Address 0x1893e278 is 184 bytes inside a block of size 928 free'd + | at 0x4842E43: free (vg_replace_malloc.c:989) + | by 0x49C1A6: CloseDevice (devices.c:1067) + | by 0x49C522: CloseOneDevice (devices.c:1193) + | by 0x49C6E4: RemoveDevice (devices.c:1244) + | by 0x5873D4: remove_master (xichangehierarchy.c:348) + | by 0x587921: ProcXIChangeHierarchy (xichangehierarchy.c:504) + | by 0x579BF1: ProcIDispatch (extinit.c:390) + | by 0x4A1D85: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551) + | by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277) + | by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34) + | Block was alloc'd at + | at 0x48473F3: calloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:1675) + | by 0x49A118: AddInputDevice (devices.c:262) + | by 0x4A0E58: AllocDevicePair (devices.c:2846) + | by 0x5866EE: add_master (xichangehierarchy.c:153) + | by 0x5878C2: ProcXIChangeHierarchy (xichangehierarchy.c:493) + | by 0x579BF1: ProcIDispatch (extinit.c:390) + | by 0x4A1D85: Dispatch (dispatch.c:551) + | by 0x4B0070: dix_main (main.c:277) + | by 0x4285E7: main (stubmain.c:34) + +To avoid that issue, make sure to free the resources when freeing the +device XkbInterest data. + +CVE-2025-62230, ZDI-CAN-27545 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer +(cherry picked from commit 10c94238bdad17c11707e0bdaaa3a9cd54c504be) + +Part-of: + +CVE: CVE-2025-62230 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton +--- + xkb/xkbEvents.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkbEvents.c b/xkb/xkbEvents.c +index 0bbd66186..3d04ecf0c 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkbEvents.c ++++ b/xkb/xkbEvents.c +@@ -1056,6 +1056,7 @@ XkbRemoveResourceClient(DevicePtr inDev, XID id) + autoCtrls = interest->autoCtrls; + autoValues = interest->autoCtrlValues; + client = interest->client; ++ FreeResource(interest->resource, RT_XKBCLIENT); + free(interest); + found = TRUE; + } +@@ -1067,6 +1068,7 @@ XkbRemoveResourceClient(DevicePtr inDev, XID id) + autoCtrls = victim->autoCtrls; + autoValues = victim->autoCtrlValues; + client = victim->client; ++ FreeResource(victim->resource, RT_XKBCLIENT); + free(victim); + found = TRUE; + } +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0004-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0004-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..5036f0c9f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg/0004-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 364f06788f1de4edc0547c7f29d338e6deffc138 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 16:30:29 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 4/4] xkb: Prevent overflow in XkbSetCompatMap() +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +The XkbCompatMap structure stores its "num_si" and "size_si" fields +using an unsigned short. + +However, the function _XkbSetCompatMap() will store the sum of the +input data "firstSI" and "nSI" in both XkbCompatMap's "num_si" and +"size_si" without first checking if the sum overflows the maximum +unsigned short value, leading to a possible overflow. + +To avoid the issue, check whether the sum does not exceed the maximum +unsigned short value, or return a "BadValue" error otherwise. + +CVE-2025-62231, ZDI-CAN-27560 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer +(cherry picked from commit 475d9f49acd0e55bc0b089ed77f732ad18585470) + +Part-of: + +CVE: CVE-2025-62231 +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Ross Burton +--- + xkb/xkb.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c +index 26d965d48..137d70da2 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkb.c ++++ b/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -2992,6 +2992,8 @@ _XkbSetCompatMap(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev, + XkbSymInterpretPtr sym; + unsigned int skipped = 0; + ++ if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > USHRT_MAX) ++ return BadValue; + if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->size_si) { + compat->num_si = compat->size_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI; + compat->sym_interpret = reallocarray(compat->sym_interpret, +-- +2.43.0 + diff --git a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb index f42f99d6c6..44ccea76f5 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-graphics/xorg-xserver/xserver-xorg_21.1.18.bb @@ -1,6 +1,11 @@ require xserver-xorg.inc -SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.patch" +SRC_URI += "file://0001-xf86pciBus.c-use-Intel-ddx-only-for-pre-gen4-hardwar.patch \ + file://0001-present-Fix-use-after-free-in-present_create_notifie.patch \ + file://0002-xkb-Make-the-RT_XKBCLIENT-resource-private.patch \ + file://0003-xkb-Free-the-XKB-resource-when-freeing-XkbInterest.patch \ + file://0004-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch \ + " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c878d1930d87725d4a5bf498c24f4be8130d5b2646a9fd0f2994deff90116352" # These extensions are now integrated into the server, so declare the migration