openssh: Security fix CVE-2015-8325

openssh <  7.2p2

(From OE-Core rev: 94325689e52cd86faf732d0cc01a29d193e6abfe)

Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Purdie <richard.purdie@linuxfoundation.org>

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh/CVE-2015-8325.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+From 85bdcd7c92fe7ff133bbc4e10a65c91810f88755 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2016 10:39:57 +1000
+Subject: [PATCH] ignore PAM environment vars when UseLogin=yes
+
+If PAM is configured to read user-specified environment variables
+and UseLogin=yes in sshd_config, then a hostile local user may
+attack /bin/login via LD_PRELOAD or similar environment variables
+set via PAM.
+
+CVE-2015-8325, found by Shayan Sadigh, via Colin Watson
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2015-8325
+Signed-off-by: Armin Kuster <akuster@mvista.com>
+
+---
+ session.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+Index: openssh-7.1p2/session.c
+===================================================================
+--- openssh-7.1p2.orig/session.c
++++ openssh-7.1p2/session.c
+@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *she
+ 	 * Pull in any environment variables that may have
+ 	 * been set by PAM.
+ 	 */
+-	if (options.use_pam) {
++	if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login) {
+ 		char **p;
+ 
+ 		p = fetch_pam_child_environment();

meta/recipes-connectivity/openssh/openssh_7.1p2.bb

@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-${PV}.tar
            file://CVE-2016-6210_p2.patch \
            file://CVE-2016-6210_p3.patch \
            file://CVE-2016-6515.patch \
+           file://CVE-2015-8325.patch \
            "
 
 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sshd"