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wpa-supplicant: patch CVE-2025-24912
Pick patches as listed in NVD CVE report. Note that Debian lists one of the patches as introducing the vulnerability. This is against what the original report [1] says. Also the commit messages provide hints that the first patch fixes this issue and second is fixing problem with the first patch. [1] https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN19358384/ (From OE-Core rev: d0907754e0b44c5e41242bc1603278f86101fa31) Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Steve Sakoman <steve@sakoman.com>
This commit is contained in:
Peter Marko
Steve Sakoman
parent
0de012f0f6
commit
d152607f64
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@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
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From 726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sat, 25 Jan 2025 11:21:16 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response
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The case of an invalid authenticator in a RADIUS response could imply
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that the response is not from the correct RADIUS server and as such,
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such a response should be discarded without changing internal state for
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the pending request. The case of an unknown response (RADIUS_RX_UNKNOWN)
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is somewhat more complex since it could have been indicated before
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validating the authenticator. In any case, it seems better to change the
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state for the pending request only when we have fully accepted the
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response.
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Allowing the internal state of pending RADIUS request to change based on
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responses that are not fully validation could have allow at least a
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theoretical DoS attack if an attacker were to have means for injecting
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RADIUS messages to the network using the IP address of the real RADIUS
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server and being able to do so more quickly than the real server and
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with the matching identifier from the request header (i.e., either by
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flooding 256 responses quickly or by having means to capture the RADIUS
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request). These should not really be realistic options in a properly
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protected deployment, but nevertheless it is good to be more careful in
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processing RADIUS responses.
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Remove a pending RADIUS request from the internal list only when having
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fully accepted a matching RADIUS response, i.e., after one of the
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registered handlers has confirmed that the authenticator is valid and
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processing of the response has succeeded.
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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CVE: CVE-2025-24912
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=726432d7622cc0088ac353d073b59628b590ea44]
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Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
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---
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src/radius/radius_client.c | 15 +++++++--------
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c
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index 2a7f36170..7909b29a7 100644
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--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c
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+++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c
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@@ -922,13 +922,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
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roundtrip / 100, roundtrip % 100);
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rconf->round_trip_time = roundtrip;
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- /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
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- if (prev_req)
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- prev_req->next = req->next;
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- else
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- radius->msgs = req->next;
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- radius->num_msgs--;
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-
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for (i = 0; i < num_handlers; i++) {
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RadiusRxResult res;
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res = handlers[i].handler(msg, req->msg, req->shared_secret,
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@@ -939,6 +932,13 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
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radius_msg_free(msg);
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/* fall through */
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case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED:
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+ /* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
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+ if (prev_req)
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+ prev_req->next = req->next;
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+ else
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+ radius->msgs = req->next;
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+ radius->num_msgs--;
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+
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radius_client_msg_free(req);
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return;
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case RADIUS_RX_INVALID_AUTHENTICATOR:
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@@ -960,7 +960,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
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msg_type, hdr->code, hdr->identifier,
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invalid_authenticator ? " [INVALID AUTHENTICATOR]" :
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"");
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- radius_client_msg_free(req);
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fail:
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radius_msg_free(msg);
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@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
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From 339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
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Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 19:23:39 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] RADIUS: Fix pending request dropping
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A recent change to this moved the place where the processed RADIUS
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request was removed from the pending list to happen after the message
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handler had been called. This did not take into account possibility of
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the handler adding a new pending request in the list and the prev_req
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pointer not necessarily pointing to the correct entry anymore. As such,
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some of the pending requests could have been lost and that would result
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in not being able to process responses to those requests and also, to a
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memory leak.
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Fix this by determining prev_req at the point when the pending request
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is being removed, i.e., after the handler function has already added a
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new entry.
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Fixes: 726432d7622c ("RADIUS: Drop pending request only when accepting the response")
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
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CVE: CVE-2025-24912
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Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=339a334551ca911187cc870f4f97ef08e11db109]
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Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <peter.marko@siemens.com>
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---
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src/radius/radius_client.c | 10 +++++++---
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/radius/radius_client.c b/src/radius/radius_client.c
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index 7909b29a7..d4faa7936 100644
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--- a/src/radius/radius_client.c
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+++ b/src/radius/radius_client.c
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@@ -824,7 +824,7 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
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struct radius_hdr *hdr;
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struct radius_rx_handler *handlers;
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size_t num_handlers, i;
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- struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req;
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+ struct radius_msg_list *req, *prev_req, *r;
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struct os_reltime now;
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struct hostapd_radius_server *rconf;
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int invalid_authenticator = 0;
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@@ -887,7 +887,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
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break;
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}
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- prev_req = NULL;
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req = radius->msgs;
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while (req) {
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/* TODO: also match by src addr:port of the packet when using
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@@ -899,7 +898,6 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
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hdr->identifier)
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break;
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- prev_req = req;
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req = req->next;
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}
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@@ -933,6 +931,12 @@ static void radius_client_receive(int sock, void *eloop_ctx, void *sock_ctx)
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/* fall through */
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case RADIUS_RX_QUEUED:
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/* Remove ACKed RADIUS packet from retransmit list */
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+ prev_req = NULL;
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+ for (r = radius->msgs; r; r = r->next) {
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+ if (r == req)
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+ break;
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+ prev_req = r;
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+ }
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if (prev_req)
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prev_req->next = req->next;
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else
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@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
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file://CVE-2022-37660-0003.patch \
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file://CVE-2022-37660-0004.patch \
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file://CVE-2022-37660-0005.patch \
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file://CVE-2025-24912-01.patch \
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file://CVE-2025-24912-02.patch \
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"
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SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"
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